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Abstract. Agro-biodiversity can provide natural insurance to risk averse farmers.
We employ a conceptual ecological-economic model to analyze the choice of agro-
biodiversity by risk averse farmers who have access to ﬁnancial insurance. We study
the implications for individually and socially optimal agro-ecosystem management
and policy design when on-farm agro-biodiversity, through ecosystem processes at
higher hierarchical levels, generates a positive externality on other farmers. We
show that for the individual farmer natural insurance from agro-biodiversty and
ﬁnancial insurance are substitutes. While an improved access to ﬁnancial insurance
leads to lower agro-biodiversity, the eﬀects on the market failure problem (due to
the external beneﬁts of on-farm agro-biodiversity) and on welfare are determined
by properties of the agro-ecosystem and agro-biodiversity’s external beneﬁts. We
derive a speciﬁc condition on agro-ecosystem functioning under which, if ﬁnancial
insurance becomes more accessible, welfare in the absence of regulation increases or
decreases.
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Farmers traditionally grow a variety of crops in order to decrease the adverse im-
pact of uncertain environmental and market conditions. That is, they use agro-
biodiversity as a form of natural income insurance. In this paper, we study how
risk-averse farmers manage their portfolio of agro-biodiversity to hedge their income
risk from uncertain environmental conditions, and how this management decision
is being aﬀected by the availability of ﬁnancial insurance. Obviously, the two op-
tions – natural insurance through agro-biodiversity and ﬁnancial insurance from the
market – are substitutes for risk-averse farmers (Baumg¨ artner 2007). So, the price
of ﬁnancial insurance has an impact on the level of agro-biodiversity cultivated on
the farm for risk-management purposes: as ﬁnancial insurance becomes cheaper, it
drives out agro-biodiversity as a form of natural insurance.
In the trade-oﬀ between ﬁnancial insurance and natural insurance through agro-
biodiversity, a market failure problem arises from the fact that agro-biodiversity
does not only provide private on-farm beneﬁts, but also gives rise to public beneﬁts
such as improved pollination or control of pests or diseases, i.e. reduced income
risk, on neighboring farms. As a general result, the privately determined level of
on-farm agro-biodiversity is lower than the socially optimal one (Heal et al. 2004).
In particular, such market failure stems from the risk-changing characteristics of
agro-biodiversity and risk-averse behavior of private farmers (Baumg¨ artner 2007,
Quaas and Baumg¨ artner, in press). In this paper, we study whether this risk-
related market failure in the allocation of agro-biodiversity is worsened or lessened
by improved access to ﬁnancial insurance.
Agro-biodiversity’s private and public insurance function, and its interrelation
with ﬁnancial insurance from the market, has diﬀerent economic dimensions. Our
analysis therefore builds upon, and combines, diﬀerent strands in the economic
literature.
Agro-biodiversity as a form of natural insurance
A number of studies have analyzed the contribution of crop diversity to the mean and
variance of agricultural yields (Smale et al. 1998, Schl¨ apfer et al. 2002, Widawsky
and Rozelle 1998, Zhu et al. 2000) and to the mean and variance of farm income
(Di Falco and Perrings 2003, 2005, Di Falco et al. 2005). One result is that agro-
biodiversity may increase the mean level, and decrease the variance, of crop yields.
This result is perfectly in line with evidence that emerged from recent theoretical,
experimental and observational research in ecology about the role of biodiversity for
the provision of ecosystem services (Hooper et al. 2005, Kinzig et al. 2002, Loreau et
2al. 2001, 2002). It has been conjectured that risk averse farmers use crop diversity
in order to hedge their income risk (Birol et al. 2005a, 2005b, Di Falco and Perrings
2003). Since agro-biodiversity has an insurance value for farmers, they tend to
employ a higher level of agro-biodiversity in the face of uncertainty (Baumg¨ artner
2007, Quaas and Baumg¨ artner, in press). The extent to which farmers rely on
agro-diversity as a natural insurance may be aﬀected by agricultural policies such as
subsidized crop yield insurance or direct ﬁnancial assistance (Di Falco and Perrings,
2005). In this respect, agro-biodiversity plays a similar role for risk averse farmers as
other risk changing production factors, such as e.g. nitrogen fertilizer or pesticides
(Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993, 1994a, 1994b).
Interaction of natural and ﬁnancial insurance
Instead of making use of natural insurance, farmers can also buy ﬁnancial insurance
to hedge their income risk. For example, in the USA for over one hundred years crop
yield insurance is oﬀered to manage agricultural risk. Since traditional crop yield
insurance is particularly vulnerable to classical insurance problems such as moral
hazard or adverse selection (e.g. Luo et al. 1994), considerable eﬀort is recently spent
to develop alternative possibilities of ﬁnancial insurance for farmers, e.g. index-based
insurance contracts (Miranda and Vedenov 2001, Skees et al. 2002, World Bank
2004).
While this eﬀort to develop instruments of ﬁnancial insurance is motivated by
the idea that reducing income risk is beneﬁcial for farmers, some studies have shown
that ﬁnancial insurance tends to have ecologically negative eﬀects. Horowitz and
Lichtenberg (1993, 1994a, 1994b) show that ﬁnancially insured farmers are likely
to undertake riskier production – with higher nitrogen and pesticide use – than
uninsured farmers do. A similar result is pointed out by Mahul (2001), assuming a
weather-based insurance. Wu (1999) empirically estimates the impact of insurance
on the crop mix and its negative results on soil erosion in Nebraska (USA).
The underlying economic reason is that agro-biodiversity as a form of natural in-
surance and ﬁnancial insurance from the market are substitutes, so that improved ac-
cess to the latter drives out the former (Baumg¨ artner 2007, Quaas and Baumg¨ artner
2006). In the insurance economics literature, the analysis of the trade-oﬀ between
‘self insurance’ (by acting such as to reduce a potential income loss) or ‘self pro-
tection’ (by acting such as to reduce the probability of an income loss) on the one
hand, and ‘market insurance’ on the other hand goes back to Ehrlich and Becker
(1972). One standard result is that self insurance and market insurance are substi-
tutes, with the result that market insurance, as it becomes cheaper, may drive out
self insurance.
3Underprovision / Overuse of public good
Since agro-biodiversity has not only a private insurance function but provides public
insurance beneﬁts as well, there is a potential public good problem associated with
the private provision of agro-biodiversity (Heal et al. 2004). For example, the extent
of genetic diversity in food crops is important as it aﬀects the risk of attack by
pathogens. A drop in diversity increases this risk. Farmers may not take this into
account when making crop choices, leading to what from a social perspective is an
inadequate level of agro-diversity.
The conventional wisdom on the use (or provision) of a public good under un-
certainty seems to be that the more uncertainty and the higher the risk aversion
of individual decision makers, the less severe is the problem of overuse (or under-
provision) of the public good (Bramoull´ e and Treich 2005, Sandler and Sterbenz
1990, Sandler et al. 1987). In a sense, this literature suggests that private uncer-
tainty and risk-aversion increase the eﬃciency of the private provision of public
goods. The focus in this literature is on the properties of the utility function, while
the production of the public good (or public bad) is typically modelled in a trivial
way, i.e. one unit of money spent on providing the public good equals one unit of
the public good provided.
Quaas and Baumg¨ artner (in press) have shown that in realistic settings, in which
the production of a public good – such as a public insurance function – is generated
in a complex system – such as a multi-scale ecosystem – things become ambiguous.
They ﬁnd that ecosystem management and environmental policy depend on the
extent of uncertainty and risk-aversion as follows: (i) Individual eﬀort to increase
the level of biodiversity unambiguously increases. However, the free-rider problem
may decrease or increase, depending on the characteristics of the ecosystem and its
management; in particular, (ii) the size of the externality may decrease or increase,
depending on how individual and aggregate management eﬀort inﬂuence biodiver-
sity; and (iii) the welfare loss due to free-riding may decrease or increase, depending
on how biodiversity inﬂuences ecosystem service provision.
If agro-biodiversity has not only a private but also a public insurance value, the
interrelationship between natural and ﬁnancial insurance becomes more complex,
too. Quaas and Baumg¨ artner (in press) have shown that while improved access
to ﬁnancial insurance leads to a lower level of agro-biodiversity, the eﬀect on the
public-good problem and on overall welfare is ambiguous and determined by agro-
ecosystem properties.
In this paper, we bring together the various ideas about agro-biodiversity and ﬁ-
4nancial insurance, and analyze them in a uniﬁed formal framework. We analyze how
a risk-averse farmer makes use of the natural insurance function of agro-biodiversity
and of ﬁnancial insurance. In particular, we study the question of how availability of
ﬁnancial insurance aﬀects the underprovision of agro-biodiversity and social welfare
when on-farm agro-biodiversity generate both a private beneﬁt and, via ecological
processes at higher hierarchical levels, also public beneﬁts.
The analysis is based on a conceptual ecological-economic model. Crop yield
is random because of exogenous sources of risk (e.g. weather, diseases or pests);
its statistical distribution (mean and variance) is determined by the level of agro-
biodiversity. The level of on-farm agro-biodiversity not only determines the distribu-
tion of farm income, but also generates external beneﬁts. The farmer is risk-averse
and chooses the level of agro-biodiversity so as to maximize the expected utility
of farm income. When making this choice, he has also access to ﬁnancial income
insurance.
We show that natural insurance through agro-biodiversity and ﬁnancial insurance
are substitutes. Hence, availability of ﬁnancial insurance reduces the demand for
natural insurance through agro-biodiversity and, thus, leads to a reduction in agro-
biodiversity. In particular, the lower the costs of ﬁnancial insurance are (i.e. the
more actuarially fair the risk premium of ﬁnancial insurance is), the lower is the
resulting level of agro-biodiversity. Yet, the eﬀects of an improved access to ﬁnancial
insurance on the market failure problem (due to the external beneﬁts of on-farm
agro-biodiversity) and on welfare are ambiguous. We derive a speciﬁc condition
on agro-ecosystem functioning under which, if ﬁnancial insurance becomes more
accessible, welfare in the absence of regulation increases or decreases.
These results are highly policy relevant. While at ﬁrst sight the introduction
of, or improved access to, ﬁnancial and insurance markets seems to be beneﬁcial to
farmers from a welfare point of view, our results demonstrate that – depending on
agro-ecosystem properties – it may have adverse welfare eﬀects.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we specify the ecological-
economic model. The analysis and results are presented in Section 3, with all proofs
and formal derivations contained in the Appendix. Section 4 discusses the results
and concludes.
2 Ecological-economic model
We consider a farmer who manages an agro-ecosystem for the service, i.e. crop yield,
it provides. Due to stochastic ﬂuctuations in environmental conditions the provision
5of the agro-ecosystem service is uncertain. Its statistical distribution depends on
the state of the agro-ecosystem in terms of agro-biodiversity, which is determined
by the farmer’s management decision. As a result, the statistical distribution of
agro-ecosystem service and, hence, of income depend on ecosystem management.
We capture these relationships in a stylized ecological-economic model as follows.
2.1 Agro-ecosystem management
The farmer chooses a level v of agro-biodiversity, say by selecting a portfolio of
diﬀerent crop varieties. Given the level of agro-biodiversity v, the agro-ecosystem
provides the farmer with the desired service, i.e. total crop yield, at a level s which is
random. For simplicity we assume that the agro-ecosystem service directly translates
into monetary income and that its mean level Es = µ is independent of the level of
agro-biodiversity and constant.1 The variance of agro-ecosystem service depends on
the level of agro-biodiversity v as follows
vars = σ
2(v) where σ
20(v) < 0 and σ
200(v) ≥ 0 . (1)
For illustrative purpose, we will consider the following speciﬁc example:
σ
2(v) = σ0 v
1−η with η > 1 . (2)
The constant η parameterizes the natural insurance function of the agro-ecosystem:2
the larger η, the stronger does the variance of agro-ecosystem service (total crop
yield) decline with the level of agro-biodiversity.
2.2 Financial insurance
In order to analyze the inﬂuence of availability of ﬁnancial insurance on the farmers’
choice of agro-biodiversity, we introduce ﬁnancial insurance in a simple and stylized
way. We assume that the farmer has the option of buying ﬁnancial insurance under
the following contract: (i) The farmer chooses the fraction a ∈ [0,1] of insurance
coverage. (ii) He receives (pays)
a(Es − s) (3)
1Empirical evidence suggests that µ may depend on v (see Section 1). We explored the impact
of such relationships in previous versions of the model. Here, we neglect such a dependence of µ
on v as it complicates the analysis while not adding further insights into the insurance dimension
of the issue under study.
2For a formal motivation in terms of agro-biodiversity’s insurance value, see Section 3.1.
6from (to) the insurance company as an actuarially fair indemniﬁcation beneﬁt (in-
surance premium) if his realized income is below (above) the mean income.3 In order
to abstract from any problems related to informational asymmetry, we assume that
the statistical distribution as well as the actual level s of agro-ecosystem service
are observable to both insurant and insurance company. (iii) In addition to (3),
the farmer pays the transaction costs of insurance. The costs of insurance over and
above the actuarially fair insurance premium, which are a measure of the ‘real’ costs
of insurance to the farmer, are assumed to follow the cost function
δ avars , (4)
where the parameter δ ≥ 0 describes how actuarially unfair is the insurance contract.
The costs increase linearly with the insured part of income variance. This captures
in the simplest way the idea that the costs of insurance increase with the ‘extent’
of insurance. Throughout the analysis we assume δ < ρ to exclude corner solutions
where a change in δ would have no eﬀect on the farmer’s behavior.
The main focus of our analysis will lie in the comparative statics with respect
to the parameter δ. Thereby we interpret a decrease in δ as an improvement in the
access to, or reduction of the costs of, ﬁnancial insurance.4
2.3 Farmer’s income, preferences and decision
The farmer chooses the level of agro-biodiversity v and ﬁnancial insurance coverage
a. A higher level of agro-biodiversity carries costs c > 0 per unit of agro-biodiversity.
These costs may be due to increased cropping, harvesting and marketing eﬀort, and
are purely private. Adding up income components, the farmer’s (random) income y
is given by
y = (1 − a)s − cv + aEs − δ avars . (5)
Since the agro-ecosystem service s is a random variable, net income y is a ran-
dom variable, too. The uncertain part of income is captured by the ﬁrst term in
Equation (5), while the other components are certain. Obviously, increasing a to
one allows the farmer to reduce the uncertain income component down to zero.
3This beneﬁt/premium-scheme is actuarially fair, because the insurance company has an ex-
pected net payment stream of E[a(Es − s)] = 0. This model of insurance is fully equivalent to
the traditional model of insurance (e.g. Ehrlich and Becker 11: 627) where losses compared with
the maximum income are insured against and the insurant pays a constant insurance premium
irrespective of actual income. In this traditional model, the net payment would exactly amount to
(3); for a formal proof see Quaas and Baumg¨ artner (in press, Appendix A.1).
4The parameter δ could be treated as a policy variable, as it could be inﬂuenced by subsidies
or taxes. Yet, in this paper we treat δ as an exogenous parameter.
7The mean Ey and the variance vary of the farmer’s income y are determined
by the mean and variance of agro-ecosystem service, which depends on the level of
agro-biodiversity (Equation 1),
Ey = µ − cv − δ aσ
2(v) and (6)
vary = (1 − a)
2 σ
2(v) . (7)
Mean income is given by the mean level of agro-ecosystem service µ, minus the
costs of agro-biodiversity cv and the costs of ﬁnancial insurance δ aσ2(v). For an
actuarially fair ﬁnancial insurance contract (δ = 0), mean income equals mean net
income from agro-ecosystem use, µ − cv. The variance of income vanishes for full
ﬁnancial insurance coverage, a = 1, and equals the full variance of agro-ecosystem
service, σ2(v), without any ﬁnancial insurance coverage, a = 0.
The farmer is assumed to be non-satiated and risk-averse with respect to his
uncertain income y. There exists empirical evidence on how agro-biodiversity in-
ﬂuences the mean and variance of agro-ecosystem services, but hardly on the full
statistical distribution. This restricts the class of risk preferences which can mean-
ingfully be represented in our ecological-economic model to utility functions which
depend only on the ﬁrst and second moment of the probability distribution, i.e. on
the mean and the variance. Speciﬁcally, we assume the following expected utility
function, where ρ > 0 is a parameter describing the farmer’s degree of risk aversion
(Arrow 1965, Pratt 1964):5




2.4 External beneﬁts of agro-biodiversity
The farmer’s private decision on the level of agro-biodiversity v aﬀects not only his
private income risk, as expressed by the variance of on-farm agro-ecosystem service,
vars (Equation 1), but also causes external eﬀects. Assume that B(v) captures the
sum of external beneﬁts of on-farm agro-biodiversity v, such as improved pollination
or control of pests or diseases, i.e. reduced income risk, on neighboring farms.6 In
particular, we shall assume that the external beneﬁt of agro-biodiversity essentially
consists in a reduction of public risk, i.e. in a reduction of the variance of some
5More general utility functions of the mean-variance type would complicate the analysis without
generating further insights.
6Quaas and Baumg¨ artner (in press) provide an explicit model of many farmers that shows how
public beneﬁts may arise from individual biodiversity management.
8public ecosystem service:
EB(v) = Υ (9)
varB(v) = Σ
2(v) where Σ
20(v) < 0 and Σ
200(v) ≥ 0 . (10)





where Ω > 0 is a parameter describing the degree of social risk aversion. Fur-
thermore, we assume that the private and the public risks associated with v are
uncorrelated. The total (i.e. private plus external) welfare eﬀect of on-farm agro-
biodiversity, thus, is:7







3 Analysis and results
The analysis proceeds in four steps: First, we identify agro-biodiversity’s private
and public insurance value (Section 3.1) Next, we discuss the laissez-faire allocation
which arises if the farmer maximizes his expected private utility from farm income
(Section 3.2). Then, we study the eﬃcient allocation which is obtained by max-
imizing social welfare (Section 3.3). Finally, we investigate how policy measures
to internalize the externalities and welfare are inﬂuenced by the access to ﬁnancial
insurance, as described by the parameter δ (Section 3.4).
3.1 The insurance value of agro-biodiversity
In order to precisely deﬁne the insurance value of agro-biodiversity, recall that by
choosing the level of agro-biodiversity v and the fraction of ﬁnancial insurance cover-
age a the farmer actually chooses a particular income lottery, which in our model is
characterized by the mean Ey = µ−cv−δ aσ2(v) and variance var y = (1−a)2 σ2(v)
(Equations 6, 7). These are determined by v and a and, therefore, one may speak
of ‘the lottery (v,a)’.
One standard method of valuing the riskiness of a lottery to a decision maker is
to calculate the risk premium R of the lottery, which is deﬁned as the amount of
money that leaves the decision maker equally well oﬀ, in terms of utility, between




2 varB − γcovar(y,B).
9the two situations of (i) receiving for sure the expected pay-oﬀ from the lottery Ey
minus the risk premium R, and (ii) playing the risky lottery with random pay-oﬀ
y (e.g. Dasgupta and Heal 1979: 381, Kreps 1990: 84). With utility function (8),





var y . (13)
In the model employed here the risk premium of the farmer’s income lottery thus







The insurance value of agro-biodiversity can now be deﬁned based on the risk pre-
mium of the lottery (v,a) (Baumg¨ artner 2007).
Deﬁnition 1
The insurance value V v of agro-biodiversity v is given by the change of the risk







Thus, the insurance value of agro-biodiversity is the marginal value of agro-biodiversity
in its function to reduce the risk premium of the farmer’s income risk from harvest-
ing uncertain agro-ecosystem services. Being a marginal value, it depends on the
existing level of agro-biodiversity v. It also depends on the actual level of ﬁnancial
insurance coverage a. The minus sign in the deﬁning Equation (15) serves to ex-
press agro-biodiversity’s ability to reduce the risk premium of the lottery (v,a) as
a positive value. Applying Deﬁnition 1 to Equation (14), one obtains the following
result for the insurance value of agro-biodiversity in this model.
Proposition 1







20(v) > 0 . (16)
From Equation (16) it is apparent that the insurance value of agro-biodiversity has
an objective, a subjective and an institutional dimension. The objective dimension
is captured by the sensitivity of the variance of agro-ecosystem services to changes in
agro-biodiversity, σ20; the subjective dimension is captured by the farmer’s degree of
risk aversion, ρ; and the institutional dimension is captured by the farmer’s extent
of ﬁnancial insurance coverage, a, which depends on institutional conditions (see be-
low). The insurance value of agro-biodiversity V v increases with the sensitivity of the
10variance of agro-ecosystem services to changes in agro-biodiversity, |σ20|, and with
the degree ρ of the farmer’s risk aversion. It decreases with the farmer’s extent of ﬁ-
nancial insurance coverage, a. In the extreme, for vanishing subjective risk-aversion,
ρ = 0, or for full ﬁnancial insurance coverage, a = 1, agro-biodiversity’s insurance
value vanishes. As a function of the level v of agro-biodiversity, the insurance value
V v(v,a) decreases: as agro-biodiversity becomes more abundant (scarcer), its insur-
ance value decreases (increases).
In the example of speciﬁcation (2), agro-biodiversity’s insurance value V v(v,a) is
isoelastic with respect to changes in the level of agro-biodiversity v, and η expresses
this elasticity.8 That is, an increase of agro-biodiversity by 1% always leads to an
increase of its insurance value by η%. This motivates the interpretaion of η as the
agro-ecosystem’s natural insurance function.






With Expression (14) for the risk premium of the income lottery (v,a), the insurance
value V a(v,a) of ﬁnancial insurance is thus given by
V
a(v,a) = ρ(1 − a)σ
2(v) . (18)
From Equation (18) it is apparent that the insurance value of ﬁnancial insurance
also has an objective, a subjective and an institutional dimension. The objective di-
mension is captured by the variance of agro-ecosystem services, σ2, which represents
the extent of potential environmental risk; the subjective dimension is captured by
the farmer’s degree of risk aversion, ρ; and the institutional dimension is captured by
the farmer’s extent of ﬁnancial insurance coverage, a, which depends on institutional
conditions (see below). The insurance value of ﬁnancial insurance V a increases with
the variance of agro-ecosystem services, σ2, i.e. with environmental risk, and with
the degree ρ of the farmer’s risk aversion. It decreases with the farmer’s extent of
actual ﬁnancial insurance coverage, a. In the extreme, for vanishing subjective risk-
aversion, ρ = 0, vanishing environmental risk, σ2=0, or for full ﬁnancial insurance
coverage, a = 1, the value of ﬁnancial insurance vanishes.
So far, we have been discussing agro-biodiversity’s private insurance value to an
individual farmer, based on the private risk premium R(v,a) (Equation 14) of the
farmer’s private income lottery. Beyond that, agro-biodiversity also has a public




∂v /V v(v,a) ≡ η.



















20(v) > 0 . (20)
The total insurance value of on-farm agro-biodiversity then is the sum of the private
and the public insurance value.
3.2 Laissez-faire allocation
As laissez-faire allocation (v?,a?) we consider the allocation in which the farmer in-
dividually chooses the level of agro-biodiversity v and ﬁnancial insurance coverage a
so as to maximize his expected private utility (Equation 8) subject to constraints (6)
and (7). Formally, the farmer’s decision problem is
max







The laissez-faire allocation has the following properties.
Proposition 2
An (interior) laissez-faire allocation exists and is unique. It is characterized by the




?) − δ a
? σ
20(v




?) = δ σ
2(v
?) (23)
The laissez-faire levels of both agro-biodiversity and ﬁnancial insurance coverage






> 0 . (24)
The laissez-faire level v? of agro-biodiversity increases, and the laissez-faire level a?






< 0 . (25)
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
Condition (22) states that the farmer will choose the level of agro-biodiversity so
as to equate the marginal beneﬁts and the marginal costs of agro-biodiversity. The
12marginal costs are given by the constant unit costs c on the right hand side. The
marginal beneﬁts are given by the expression on the left hand side and comprise two
terms: the insurance value of agro-biodiversity and the reduction in payments for
ﬁnancial insurance that results from the reduced variance of agro-ecosystem service
due to a marginal increase in agro-biodiversity.
Likewise, Condition (23) states that the level of ﬁnancial insurance coverage is
chosen so as to equate the marginal beneﬁts and the marginal costs of ﬁnancial
insurance, where the marginal beneﬁt is the insurance value and the marginal costs
are the (marginal) transaction costs. This condition can be rearranged into
a




which states that the farmer will choose the level of ﬁnancial insurance coverage as
follows. In the absence of transaction costs, i.e. for δ = 0, he chooses full coverage by
ﬁnancial insurance, i.e. a? = 1. As transaction costs of ﬁnancial insurance increase,
i.e. for δ > 0, he chooses partial coverage by ﬁnancial insurance, 0 < a? < 1, and if
transaction costs are so high that δ = ρ he chooses no ﬁnancial insurance coverage,
a? = 0.9
Both the level of agro-biodiversity and the level of ﬁnancial insurance coverage
increase with the degree of the farmer’s risk-aversion (Result 24), since both instru-
ments allow him to hedge his income risk. As diﬀerent forms of insurance the two
are substitutes: as ﬁnancial insurance becomes more expensive, i.e. δ increases, the
farmer reduces his demand for ﬁnancial insurance coverage and increases his level
of agro-biodiversity (Result 25). Put the other way: as ﬁnancial insurance becomes
cheaper, it drives out agro-biodiversity as the natural insurance. In any case, with
ﬁnancial insurance available, the farmer will choose a level of agro-biodiversity which
is below the one that he would choose if ﬁnancial insurance was not available.10
3.3 Eﬃcient allocation
The eﬃcient allocation (ˆ v,ˆ a) is derived by choosing the level of agro-biodiversity v
and ﬁnancial insurance coverage a so as to maximize total welfare (Equation 12),
subject to Constraints (9), (10), (6) and (7):
max











9Recall that we assume δ ≤ ρ throughout in order to focus on interior solutions. For δ > ρ, the
optimization problem (21) would have a corner solution, a? = 0, with da?/dρ = da?/dδ = 0.
10This level can be determined from setting a = 0 in Problem 21 and maximizing over v. It is
strictly smaller than v? for all δ < ρ and equals v? for δ ≥ ρ, i.e. in cases where ﬁnancial insurance
is so expensive that an optimizing farmer would not buy it.
13The eﬃcient allocation has the following properties.
Proposition 3
An (interior) solution to problem (27) exists and is unique. It is characterized by
the following necessary and suﬃcient conditions:
V
v(ˆ v,ˆ a) + V
pub(ˆ v) − δ ˆ aσ
20(ˆ v) = c (28)
V
a(ˆ v,ˆ a) = δ σ
2(ˆ v) (29)
The eﬃcient levels of both agro-biodiversity and ﬁnancial insurance coverage in-






> 0 . (30)
The eﬃcient level of agro-biodiversity increases with, and the eﬃcient level of ﬁnan-






= 0 . (31)
The eﬃcient level ˆ v of agro-biodiversity increases, and the eﬃcient level ˆ a of ﬁnancial






< 0 . (32)
Proof: see Appendix A.2
The properties of the eﬃcient allocation are very similar in structure to those of
the laissez-faire allocation (cf. Proposition 2). The diﬀerence between the eﬃcient
and the laissez-faire allocation is that in the eﬃcient allocation the positive exter-
nality, which a private farmer’s eﬀort has on society at large in terms of a reduced
variance of public beneﬁts, is fully internalized: ﬁrst order condition (28), which
demands equality of marginal beneﬁts and costs of agro-biodiversity, includes not
only the private insurance value but also the public insurance value, i.e. the full
social insurance value, of agro-biodiversity.
This changes the eﬀect that an increase in the transaction costs of ﬁnancial insur-
ance has on the management eﬀort and ﬁnancial insurance coverage in magnitude,
but not in sign. Hence, the same arguments hold which support Proposition 2:
with increasing transaction costs δ of ﬁnancial insurance it is optimal to substitute
ﬁnancial insurance by natural insurance.
As in the laissez-faire allocation, the eﬃcient levels of agro-biodiversity, ˆ v, and
ﬁnancial insurance coverage, ˆ a, increase with the degree of individual risk aversion,
ρ.
143.4 Welfare eﬀects of improved access to ﬁnancial insurance
Comparing the laissez-faire allocation (cf. Proposition 2) with the eﬃcient alloca-
tion (cf. Proposition 3), it becomes apparent that there is market failure: Due to
the external beneﬁt of on-farm agro-biodiversity, the laissez-faire allocation is not
eﬃcient. In the laissez-faire allocation a private farmer chooses a level of agro-
biodiversity that is too low compared to the socially optimal level, because he does
not take into account the positive externality on society at large. As a result, welfare
is lower in the laissez-faire allocation than in the eﬃcient allocation.
Proposition 4
The laissez-faire level of agro-biodiversity is lower than the eﬃcient level, while the
level of ﬁnancial insurance coverage is the same in both allocations. As a result,
laisser-faire welfare is lower than welfare in the eﬃcient allocation.
v
? < ˆ v , (33)
a
? = ˆ a , (34)
W
? < ˆ W . (35)
Proof: see Appendix A.3
In order to implement the eﬃcient allocation, a regulator could impose a Pigou-
vian subsidy on agro-biodiversity. Denoting by τ the subsidy per unit of v, the
optimization problem of a private farmer under such regulation then reads
max






2(v) + τ v . (36)
Comparing the ﬁrst order conditions for the eﬃcient allocation (Problem 27) and
for the regulated allocation (Problem 36), we obtain the optimal subsidy ˆ τ.
Proposition 5
The eﬃcient allocation is implemented if a subsidy ˆ τ on agro-biodiversity is set with




20(ˆ v) > 0 . (37)
The optimal subsidy increases with the degree Ω of social risk aversion, and de-










< 0 . (38)
Proof: see Appendix A.4.
The Pigouvian subsidy ˆ τ captures the positive externality of on-farm agro-biodiversity
on society at large. It is exactly given by agro-biodiversity’s public insurance value
15(Equation 20). Hence, the optimal subsidy is higher, the higher the public insurance
beneﬁts of agro-biodiversity are.
The optimal subsidy ˆ τ can be interpreted as a measure of the extent of regulation
necessary to internalize the externality, i.e. to solve the public-good problem. Thus,
it can also be interpreted as a measure of the size of the externality.
Clearly, the size of the externality depends on the costs δ of ﬁnancial insurance.
The eﬀect of higher costs of ﬁnancial insurance on the market failure is unambiguous.
Condition (38) states that increasing costs of ﬁnancial insurance decrease the market
failure.
After having studied the eﬀect of ﬁnancial insurance on the size of the externality,
we now turn to the question of how increased costs of ﬁnancial insurance inﬂuence
welfare. In a ﬁrst-best economy, where the external eﬀect is perfectly internalized,
e.g. by the Pigouvian subsidy (37), the answer to this question is simple: higher
costs of ﬁnancial insurance are always welfare decreasing in a ﬁrst-best world.11
This is not necessarily the case in the second-best world of the laissez-faire alloca-
tion where the externality of on-farm agro-biodiversity is present. Whether welfare
in the laissez-faire allocation (Equation 12)
W
? ≡ µ + Υ − cv
















increases or decreases with the costs of ﬁnancial insurance, δ, depends on the relative
size of two eﬀects: (i) the direct eﬀect of increased insurance costs is always negative
(this is the only eﬀect present in the ﬁrst best); (ii) the indirect eﬀect that increased
costs of ﬁnancial insurance lead to an increased level of agro-biodiversity is positive
(Proposition 2). The condition for whether one or the other eﬀect dominates is given
in the following proposition.
Proposition 6
With increasing costs of ﬁnancial insurance welfare in the laissez-faire allocation













which is equivalent to
V
pub(v













11This follows from applying the envelope theorem on total welfare (12) with respect to δ.
16Proof: see Appendix A.5.
The right hand side of Condition (40) expresses the direct eﬀect that expenditures
for ﬁnancial insurance increase with δ. This eﬀect decreases welfare. The left hand
side of Condition (40) captures the indirect eﬀect that on-farm biodiversity increases
with δ (Proposition 2). Welfare is improved by the increase in v? weighted by a factor
of −Ω
2 Σ20(v?) > 0 which quantiﬁes the positive externality of the private choice of
on-farm agro-biodiversity on society at large. The overall welfare eﬀect depends
on the balance between these two eﬀects. In particular, if the indirect eﬀect is
suﬃciently large welfare in the laissez-faire even increases with the costs of ﬁnancial
insurance.
Condition (40) can be expressed in the fundamental parameters of the model, and
in terms of the private and public insurance value of agro-biodiversity (Condition 41).
On the left hand side is the public (marginal) beneﬁt, i.e. the public insurance value,
of agro-biodiversity. On the right hand side is the private (marginal) beneﬁt of
agro-biodiversity, i.e. the private insurance value plus the indirect beneﬁt of reduced
costs of ﬁnancial insurance, weighted by a factor of σ2(v?)σ200(v?)/[σ20(v?)]2 which
expresses the agro-ecosystem’s natural insurance function. In the example of an









As η increases from 1 to inﬁnity, this factor decreases from inﬁnity to 1. So, the
larger the agro-ecosystem’s natural insurance function, the smaller is this factor.
With this, Condition (41) states that laissez-faire welfare W ? decreases with the
costs δ of ﬁnancial insurance if the agro-ecosystem is characterized by a low natural
insurance function, the private insurance value of agro-biodiversity is high, and its
public insurance value is low. Under these circumstances, the negative direct eﬀect of
ﬁnancial insurance costs to private farmers dominates over its positive indirect eﬀect
of increased agro-biodiversity. So, an increase in private insurance costs decreases
total welfare. Interestingly, the reverse may also happen in the second-best world
where the agro-biodiversity externality is not internalized: an increase in private
insurance costs may increase total welfare. This holds for a situation in which the
agro-ecosystem is characterized by a high natural insurance function, the private
insurance value of agro-biodiversity is low, and its public insurance value is high.
Under these circumstances, the positive indirect eﬀect, i.e. an increase in the level of
agro-biodiversity and the associated public and private insurance value, outweighs
the negative direct eﬀect of increased costs of ﬁnancial insurance.
17After having studied the eﬀect of improved access to ﬁnancial insurance on
laissez-faire welfare, we now look at how improved access to ﬁnancial insurance
aﬀects the welfare loss from the market failure, which is due to the external beneﬁts
of agro-biodiversity. This welfare loss in the laissez-faire allocation compared with
the eﬃcient allocation is given by
ˆ W − W
































where v? < ˆ v and a? = ˆ a so that ˆ W − W ? > 0 (Proposition 4). The properties of
the welfare loss are as follows:
Proposition 7
With increasing costs of ﬁnancial insurance the welfare loss from market failure
in the allocation of agro-biodiversity increases / decreases / is unchanged, i.e.
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Proof: see Appendix A.6.
Condition (44) about the welfare loss ˆ W − W ? is essentially the same as Con-
dition (41) about the laissez-faire welfare level W ?, amended by a factor of 1 −
σ2(ˆ v)/σ2(v?), which may take on values between zero and one depending on the
agro-ecosystem’s natural insurance function. So, essentially all interpretations of
Proposition 6 carry over to the interpretation of Proposition 7. The additional fac-
tor of 1−σ2(ˆ v)/σ2(v?) in Condition (44) implies that the larger the deviation of the
laissez-faire level of agro-biodiversity v? from its eﬃcient level ˆ v, the greater are the
chances that the welfare loss increases with the costs of ﬁnancial insurance.
4 Conclusions
We have analyzed how a risk-averse farmer manages his portfolio of agro-biodiversity
so as to hedge his income risk. The ecological-economic model captures two stylized
facts: (i) On-farm agro-biodiversity provides beneﬁts not just at the farm level,
but also provides external beneﬁts. (ii) The variance of private and public beneﬁts
18decreases with the level of agro-biodiversity. Thus, agro-biodiversity has a natural
insurance function.
Financial insurance is a substitute for natural insurance from agro-biodiversity.
As a consequence, higher costs of ﬁnancial insurance lead to a higher demand for
natural insurance, and thus, to a higher level of agro-biodiversity. Put the other
way around, introducing institutions for, or improving access to, ﬁnancial insurance
leads to a lower level of agro-biodiversity, as farmers substitute natural insurance
from agro-biodiversity by ﬁnancial insurance.
Due to the external beneﬁts of on-farm agro-biodiversity, the laissez-faire al-
location is not eﬃcient. In order to study how this market failure is aﬀected by
the availability of ﬁnancial insurance we have analyzed how (i) the extent of reg-
ulation necessary to implement the eﬃcient allocation and (ii) how welfare in the
laissez-faire allocation depend on the transaction costs of ﬁnancial insurance.
We found that the Pigouvian subsidy, as a measure of the extent of eﬃcient
regulation in a ﬁrst-best world, unambiguously decreases with the costs of ﬁnancial
insurance. We also found that in a second-best world where such regulation does not
exist, or is not properly enforced, it is even possible that improved access to ﬁnancial
insurance decreases welfare. While this is, in principle, well-known from second-best
theory, we have derived a speciﬁc condition on agro-ecosystem functioning under
which this happens (Conditions 41 and 44): improved access to ﬁnancial insurance
will have a negative impact on total welfare if the agro-ecosystem is characterized by
a high natural insurance function, the private insurance value of agro-biodiversity
is low, and its public insurance value is high.
These results are highly relevant for agricultural, environmental and development
policy. In so far as it is one aim of development policy to introduce, and improve
access to, ﬁnancial and insurance markets, our analysis shows that such a policy has
unambiguously negative implications for agro-biodiversity. Furthermore, our results
highlight that properties of agro-ecosystems determine whether welfare increases or
decreases under such a policy. Unless a sound agro-biodiversity policy is in place,
which should internalize the public beneﬁts of agro-biodiversity for private farmers,
improving farmers’ access to ﬁnancial and insurance markets regardless of agro-
ecosystem properties may have adverse welfare eﬀects.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Written down explicitly, the ﬁrst order conditions (22) and (23) for the interior















?) = δ σ
2(v
?) (A.2)
Condition (A.2) can be solved to
a










































































Diﬀerentiating (A.3) with respect to ρ and δ is straight forward and yields expres-
sions for da?/dρ and da?/dδ.
23A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Written down explicitly, the ﬁrst order conditions (28) and (29) for the interior
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20(ˆ v) = c (A.9)
ρ(1 − ˆ a)σ
2(ˆ v) = δ σ
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Condition (A.10) can be solved to
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σ200(ˆ v) + Ω
2 Σ200(ˆ v)
> 0 (A.17)
Diﬀerentiating (A.10) with respect to ρ and δ is straight forward and yields expres-
sions for dˆ a/dρ, dˆ a/dΩ and dˆ a/dδ.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) From Conditions (A.3) and (A.11) it is apparent that a? = ˆ a.
(ii) As a? = ˆ a, Conditions (22) and (28) can be interpreted as equations of
functions of the single variable v that determine the levels of v? and ˆ v, respectively.
Both conditions have as their right-hand side the constant c, and as their left-hand
24side a strictly decreasing function of v, so that v? and ˆ v are uniquely determined.
As the term V pub(v) = −Ω
2 Σ20(v) is strictly positive for all v, the left-hand side of
Condition (28) is strictly greater than the left-hand side of Condition (22) for all v.
As a result the value of v that equates the left-hand side with the right-hand side is
strictly greater for Condition (28) than for Condition (22), i.e. ˆ v > v?.
(iii) ˆ W ≥ W ? by deﬁnition of the eﬃcient allocation as the allocation that
maximizes W. Strict inequality follows from strict concavity of W in ˆ v and ˆ v > v?.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
The ﬁrst order conditions for the interior solution of Problem (36), which are ob-
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Comparison of Condition (A.18) with Condition (A.9) reveals that
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 6









































































A.6 Proof of Proposition 7
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